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Abstract
Peace-building between Palestinians and Israelis has failed so far because of dis-
synergetic international efforts as focus has shifted away from the political issues
laying at the heart of the conflict to "security issues". Building conceptually on
"human security" approaches, this article will contend that no sustainable peace
is possible if political "root causes" are not addressed and if "security" is only
attached to Israelis.
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After decades of mutual recognition, denial and multifaceted conflict between Israel and the Palestinians, the Oslo agreement (September 1993) 
raised high expectations regarding the settlement 
of the conflict. Fifteen years later however, 
the failure is almost total. In spite of sporadic 
international efforts, not a single significant 
breakthrough has occurred since the wreckage 
of the Oslo peace process and the beginning of 
the Al-Aqsa Intifada (September 2000), and the 
reality on the ground is grim. This is not because 
of the death toll: actually, “only” some 7500 
people have been killed since the beginning of 
the second Intifada, a modest figure comparing 
to other conflicts.1 Rather, what is most ominous 
is the extent to which Palestinian and Israeli 
societies have drifted further apart on almost 
every level. While the latter has managed to garner 
international support for its views and agenda and 
to better integrate to the international community 
during recent years2,  the Palestinian side has 
reached unprecedented levels of deprivation 
ranging from the political realm through the 
economic to the basic human rights field. To put it 
in the terminology of human security approaches, 
while Israel is relatively prosperous and copes 
with its present circumstances, neighbouring 
Palestinians are free neither from fear nor from 
want. a few basic figures illustrate the depth of 
the socio-economic rift between both societies.3 
Life expectancy at birth is 81 years in Israel, 73 
in the Palestinian territories (PT); mortality rate 
for under 5 (per 1000) is 5 in Israel, 27 in the PT.4 
GDP per capita estimates for 2008 are 2.900 USD 
in the PT and 28.200 USD in Israel.5  Relying on 
2007 surveys, the International Monetary Fund 
reports that 80% of households live below the 
poverty line in Gaza and 45% in the West Bank. 
Though updated data is not yet available, the report 
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assesses that in 2008 and early 2009 “humanitarian 
situation has worsened” and “several economic 
indicators suggest that economic conditions have 
deteriorated markedly” in Gaza.6 In comparison, 
the 2008 unemployment rate in Israel is 6.0% 
and the poverty rate is 18.5%.7 Coupled with 
qualitative analyses, these figures indicate that 
the Israelis, though concerned by their individual 
and collective security, belong to the world of 
the wealthy developed countries where most 
people enjoy high living standards and have 
good chances to live “decent lives”. Conversely, 
the Palestinians live in a world of cumulative 
exclusions that threaten their collective identity 
and individual lives. Taking seriously the insights 
of human security approaches that relate violence 
to the interconnected effects of economic 
deprivation, identity politics and political, social, 
and cultural antagonisms,8   this paper posits that 
the discrepancy between Israeli and Palestinian 
predicaments is threatening for future peace. It 
then goes to defend the view that this dangerous 
situation results mainly from dis-synergetic 
international efforts.9 Indeed, under the tight 
control of the United States over the access to 
the political track of the peace process, the focus 
of international efforts has dramatically shifted 
away from political issues to narrow security 
issues very much defined according to Israeli 
priorities with the US often uncritical support. 
Arguably, this hard security-centred policy has 
led to an overall degradation of the Palestinian 
situation and to the waning of peace prospects. 
This contrast between an intensive diplomatic 
and financial involvement of the international 
community and a visible worsening of the situation 
calls for a reflection upon the interaction between 
the political conduct of conflict settlement and 
the other aspects of peace-building as dealt with 
by the international community. The first section 
will focus on the human security approaches and 
their insights regarding the potential of violent 
conflict borne by individual and collective 
insecurities. On these grounds, the second section 
will demonstrate how the policies and courses of 
action adopted by the major international players 
in the Palestinian-Israeli field since 1993 have 
contributed to the wreckage of the Oslo peace 
process. Then, building on some lessons drawn 
from the observable failures and on human 
security approaches, the third section will lead 
to the conclusion that it is impossible to build 
any sustainable peace between Israelis and 
Palestinians if the political root causes of conflict 
are not plainly addressed at the same time as all 
other aspects of a settlement, and if security is 
only attached to Israelis while Palestinian security 
remains absent from international authoritative 
concerns.
Human Security: new inSigHt on tHe 
iSraeli-PaleStinian conflict
 
Various explanations exist regarding the 
persistence of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Most 
people sharing common Israeli views would stress 
Palestinian violence as the major cause of conflict. 
Many of those who believe that Palestinians are 
entitled to achieve their right to self-determination 
consider that the occupation of the territories 
seized in 1967 is the main obstacle to peace. Other 
dimensions of the conflict are frequently pointed 
at such as religion, civilization, colonization or 
terrorism. However, most explanations remain 
too simplistic or one-sided. Actually, what makes 
the conflict so complex is the aggregation of 
innumerable conflict-laden dimensions, all highly 
evolutionary, intimately intertwined, cross-
breeding and mutually reinforcing, and able to 
generate new dynamics, thus further complicating 
the conflict. Going through all these dimensions 
is obviously beyond the scope of this article. 
Instead, the use of the notion of human security 
might offer valuable insights as it approaches 
conflict in an encompassing fashion. 
Actually, the notion of human security has emerged 
once the sands of the Cold War had settled, revealing 
a host of civil conflicts and many insecurities 
threatening the stability of the international order 
in a globalizing and increasingly interdependent 
world. This new context has encouraged new 
understandings of security leading to both its 
deepening (as to refocus on the individual) and its 
widening (as to embrace non-military threats)10. 
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One milestone is the publication by the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) of the 
1994 Human Development Report. Taking a new 
encompassing look at the world, the Report stated 
that the latter “can never be at peace unless people 
have security in their daily lives” for conflicts’ 
origins are increasingly “buried deep in growing 
socio-economic deprivation and disparities”11. 
Hence, the UNDP advocated a shift from the 
state-centred concept of “nuclear security” that 
had magnetized most thinking about security 
during the Cold War to a people-centred concept 
of “human security”, for global peace cannot be 
achieved unless “ordinary” people all over the 
world enjoy both freedom from fear and freedom 
from want. Securing both components of human 
security would require curbing threats in seven 
realms and, correspondingly, providing for 
economic, food, health, environmental, personal, 
community and political security.12
But human security turned into an “essentially 
contested concept”13.  It does not elicit consensus 
on its definition, its content, its uses, let alone its 
status (is it a concept, a mere notion, an approach, 
a paradigm or a political agenda?)14.  At the 
analytical level, it has triggered an unfinished 
debate. Some have almost dismissed it as a concept 
with any analytical usefulness and view it as a 
simple label for a particular “brand of research” 
in the security studies field.15 Other scholars 
have attempted to work out more satisfactory 
definitions to make the notion more rigorous. The 
lack of a consensual definition has not however 
prevented further research on human security both 
as a concept (analytical and operational) and as a 
paradigmatic lens used to explore international 
issues such as conflict and peace, human rights, 
humanitarian law, civil society, security, world 
order, development or globalization.
Though accounts might differ, two major schools 
of thought have come to exist: the “narrow” and 
the “broad”16.  The narrow conception is usually 
equated with freedom from fear and focuses on 
military and physical pervasive threats to people’s 
life, safety and basic rights. Its proponents believe 
it necessary to prioritize the threats in order to 
better understand insecurity, target the actions 
needed to enhance human security, and usefully 
commit resources. Conversely, the broader 
conception, or freedom from want, embraces the 
full range of concerns highlighted by the UNDP, 
particularly those rooted in “the distributive 
aspects of development” and “socio-economic 
inequalities and a lack of social justice”17. The 
proponents of this conception share the view that 
human security is indivisible and highlight the 
interconnectedness of “a host of factors that in 
combination produce insecurity”.18
The debate between the two schools has addressed 
questions related to the strategies, the actors, the 
means and instruments better suited to enhance 
the security of individuals and peoples. However, 
in spite of often sound criticism, the narrower 
view could not so far overweigh the relevance 
of the arguments of the tenets –both analysts 
and practitioners– of the broader view. Rather, a 
trend has emerged that argues that the two visions 
are essentially complementary: “they represent 
two integral and interrelated components of the 
condition of human security and of the emerging 
human security approach, based on the common 
value of all human beings. On its own, each aspect 
represents a necessary but insufficient ingredient 
for human security”19.  Both are needed to grasp 
actual pervasive insecurities to the individual that 
nurture violence, conflict and instability. And in 
order to successfully provide “human security 
public goods” for greater scores of people, it is 
crucial to combine the joint efforts, strategies and 
instruments of all kinds of actors and coalitions 
able and willing to contribute to the enhancement 
of human security worldwide and, subsequently, 
stability and peace.20
Beyond the most theoretical and political debates 
on human security, the notion has taken root not 
only in research but also in the discourses, agendas, 
policies and programmes of various international 
actors (middle power states seeking to carve out a 
distinctive international role through a principled 
foreign policy; international organizations and 
development agencies; NGOs)21.  Though each 
may have a different understanding of what human 
security is and varying views about its substance, 
scope, purposes, instruments and priorities, 
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human security advocates have managed to 
promote a distinctive agenda. Through active 
networking, they have eventually scored two 
visible achievements: the adoption of the “Ottawa 
Convention” banning anti-personnel mines and the 
creation of the International Criminal Court22.  As 
put by a Canadian official, human security is “An 
idea that works in practice”23,  hence the initiative 
of using it in the context of Israeli-Palestinian 
affairs. As traditional perspectives have obviously 
failed to understand the conflict, let alone to 
alleviate it by effective courses of action, human 
security insights bring an alternative inquisitive 
look.
The first and most salient insight is the one 
popularized by UNDP’s 1994 Report, according 
to which traditional state-centred and overly 
militarized conceptions of security are no more 
able to grasp the dynamics and logics of current 
conflicts and insecurities. Hence the need to 
refocus on the individual and tangible threats to 
her/his life and, beyond, her/his basic material and 
immaterial needs –what tenets of critical security 
studies refer to as “emancipation”.24 Relatedly, 
this shift has questioned traditional assumptions 
about the state and challenged the concept of 
sovereignty as traditionally perceived. Indeed, 
the notion of human security highlights the fact 
that states can be deadly to civil populations, first 
and foremost (but not only) to their own citizens, 
because of predatory/repressive practices by the 
political establishment, and/or because of their 
collapse and inability to secure order and safety 
for the people. With post-Cold War evolutions 
and the strengthening of human rights concerns, 
state sovereignty has lost some of its absoluteness 
as notions of “responsibility” emerged, 
prompting international intervention in some 
cases of massive abuses.25  However, in spite of 
the increased questioning of states’ behaviour, 
the state is nowhere near demise. Moreover, it 
is viewed by most actors and analysts as part of 
both the problem and the solution. If repressive, 
predatory, or failed, the state poses a threat to all 
those who depend on it; if based on the rule of law 
and geared for securing the well-being of all those 
who depend on its authority, it can be a human 
security provider and a shield against various 
menaces26.  Moreover, states are still dominant 
actors as they steer international institutions, 
negotiate and ratify agreements, provide resources 
needed for peace interventions and can therefore 
contribute to the quest for human security. The 
second set of insights brought by the notion of 
human security is the one concerned with the 
relationship between conflict on the one hand, 
and vulnerability to threats deriving from fear 
and want on the other hand. Close observation 
suggests that these various elements highlighted 
by human security thinking are relevant to the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
This is particularly the case of state-centred 
versus individual-centred conceptions of security. 
Though Israel has been created to secure one 
of the most insecure communities in Europe –
the Jews– and still conducts its policies in the 
name of the protection of Jewish lives, it is a 
well-established and strongly institutionalized 
state that has the military, political and financial 
power to prevail and pursue the occupation of 
neighbouring lands. Conversely, the Palestinians 
have never enjoyed a state of their own that 
would shield them from neighbouring states, 
particularly Israel. The Palestinian Authority (PA) 
that has been established by virtue of the Oslo 
agreement has never approximated an institution, 
let alone a state, enjoying the authority and the 
means necessary to stand for its population. 
Moreover, born in unfavourable circumstances, 
it has quickly transformed into a corrupt and 
repressive actor further jeopardizing the security 
of the Palestinians.27  So the conflict is neither an 
inter-state nor a civil one. It opposes a powerful 
state and a few millions of stateless Palestinians 
with little command of their collective fate and 
personal lives as Israel pursues the occupation of 
their territories in violation of human rights norms 
and international law.28
However, despite an increased acknowledgement 
that state sovereignty should end where massive 
abuses start, the international community 
has failed to decisively support the stateless 
Palestinians. This is so mainly because Israel has 
managed to frame Palestinian violence as the main 
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enduring obstacle to any peace progress therefore 
dismissing the fact that Palestinian violence 
has been nurtured by occupation and correlated 
phenomena: dispossession, the weakening of 
Palestinian social and political fabric, routinized 
human rights breaches by the Israeli forces 
(arrests, administrative detention, torture), and 
particularly in the post-Oslo era, the acceleration 
of colonization, the closures of the territories and 
the ensuing economic and social estrangement of 
the whole Palestinian society that has increased 
with the Second Intifada and culminated with the 
reactions to the Hamas legislative victory.29
Human security lenses allow for a more 
comprehensive view of the situation as they 
suggest that, contrary to the Israeli dominant 
discourse, violence is not inscribed in Palestinian 
identity but results to a very large extent from 
the conditions of fear and want in which a whole 
society lives since several decades, with the 
international community largely overlooking this 
fundamental fact.
international diS-Synergetic PolicieS 
and tHe fading of tHe Peace ProceSS  
Before reviewing international dis-synergetic and 
dichotomous policies, a basic question needs to be 
answered: why focus on the role and responsibility 
of the “international community”?30After all, 
Israeli leaders have repeatedly stated that external 
interferences would be counter-productive and that 
Palestinians, though eager to drag international 
involvement, are perfectly able to negotiate for 
themselves. Objectively however, the asymmetry 
between both parties is so overwhelming that 
negotiations on a supposedly equal footing can 
be nothing but the imposition of the stronger 
side’s will on the weaker.31  While the first enjoys 
military power, wealth, development, money and 
the support of Western political establishments, 
the Palestinians cumulate handicaps: poverty, 
divisions, radicalism, cultural remoteness, the 
post-9/11 confusions about terrorism and religious 
belonging, and consequently, the delegitimization 
of their resistance.32 Though they are those who 
suffer most from the situation, Palestinians do 
not possess the cards allowing them to seduce 
Israelis out of unilateralism. Conversely, Israel 
possesses the major cards save the ability to 
totally curb Palestinian irredentism. However, 
it has always been able to minimize the costs of 
conflict and to use the political standstill to pursue 
expansionist policies, displaying a lack of interest 
in the land for peace formula as the persistence of 
colonization suggests.
Second, some of the core states of the international 
community have a paramount responsibility in the 
setting of the conflict, i.e. mainly: the colonialist 
use of Palestinian territories after World War I, 
the tragedy of European Jews and the subsequent 
creation of Israel, the UN partition plan and tens 
of unimplemented Security Council resolutions.33 
Third, the core states of the international 
community are precisely those who have set the 
standards according to which: 1) Palestinians 
are entitled to rebel against oppression and to 
achieve self-determination, 2) Israel is seriously 
violating fundamental international law and 
abusing Palestinians’ human rights. Fourth, the 
international community is involved in ways that 
make it perpetuate the fundamental asymmetry 
between the parties and therefore the continuation 
of the conflict. These reasons and many others 
ranging from ethical considerations (failure to 
assist a people undergoing a major threat) to 
security concerns (the deleterious effects of the 
conflict at both the Middle-Eastern and global 
levels) make an effective involvement of the 
international community a must for the settlement 
of the conflict. This arguably implies supporting 
the Palestinians in obtaining an acceptable 
political deal and improved living conditions, and 
pushing Israel towards an equitable and workable 
peace process. Put differently, the international 
community has a pivotal role in ensuring that 
what Israel defines as its security needs does not 
come at the expenses of the basic human security 
of its neighbours.34
Looking back at the Oslo years and on, the pattern 
of international involvement has evolved rather 
in the opposite direction. As will be shown, the 
international community embraced in the early 
stages of the process the dual programme set by 
Global Images
HUMAN SECURITY JOURNAL                Volume 8, Spring 2009
▪ 78 ▪
Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) that provided for political and economic 
issues to be simultaneously addressed. However, 
as difficulties multiplied and generated new 
cycles of violence, the international focus drifted 
over the years towards the prioritization of Israel’s 
security concerns and away from issues pertaining 
to Palestinian political aspirations and “fear 
insecurities”, rather concentrating its resources on 
trying to alleviate “want insecurities”. This course 
of action has somehow proven to be like pouring 
water in a broken jar. None of the efforts allowed 
for the improvement of Palestinians’ daily lives 
and political prospects and, correlatively, for a 
reduction of tensions. Quite the opposite; tensions 
kept building up until the long-forecast explosion 
occurred: the Second Intifada. Furthermore, as 
the conflict’s chains of causality were partly re-
written after the 9/11 US-centred earthquake, the 
Palestinian predicament further deteriorated.
the strengthening of dichotomous Patterns in 
international involvement
Though the Oslo agreement was in itself a clear 
indication of the shortcomings of US peace-
brokering,35  Washington immediately stepped in 
as to monopolize the political track of the incipient 
peace process. The rest of the international 
community, particularly the European Union 
and its member states, were called in to support 
and fund the Palestinian Autonomy. The benefits 
of the new era were however slow to come. As 
early as October 1993, the Israeli government 
made it clear that the initial schedule could not 
be respected notably due to security issues.36 As 
deep divergences between the two negotiating 
parties began to uncover with the US unwilling to 
arbitrate, violence continued unabated, whether 
wielded by extremist Palestinian activists or 
Israeli settlers and regular forces. Besides, the 
pace of settlement hastened and the closure of the 
PT became more frequent. A new wave of violence 
erupted after the killing by a settler of some 30 
Palestinians in Hebron (February 1994) that was 
followed by an inconclusive reaction by Israel on 
settlement issues and a US veto to a condemnation 
of the massacre by the Security Council. Parallel 
to the first suicide-attacks and Israeli retaliation, 
major clashes occurred between Arafat’s Fatah 
and Hamas’ activists, signalling a decrease in the 
legitimacy of the Palestinian leadership and this 
latter’s shift towards a repressive style.
Yet, encouraged by the US and the international 
community, negotiations proceeded and several 
agreements were concluded, providing for 
economic cooperation and for the handing over 
of major Palestinian cities and some powers to 
the new Palestinian Authority (PA). Eroded by the 
closures and the pursuit of heavy-handed Israeli 
practices, autonomy did not alter significantly the 
daily experience of Palestinians. Moreover, the 
terms if the various agreements aroused increased 
dissatisfaction within the Palestinian society. 
This was particularly the case of the “Oslo II” 
agreement (September 1995) that was criticised 
for reversing the “land for peace”37 logic  as 
it provided for territorial continuity between 
Israel and Jewish settlements while dividing 
the PT into a constellation of non-contiguous 
enclaves with different levels of autonomy.38  If 
the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin gave 
peace efforts a new momentum, the dynamic was 
broken by the killing of a Hamas bomb expert that 
triggered a wave of suicide-attacks by Palestinians 
activists. In an attempt to support Shimon Peres 
in the forthcoming Israeli elections, the Clinton 
administration convened an international 
conference on terrorism that was critical in 
redirecting the Palestinian-Israeli agenda on 
narrowly-defined security issues. From then 
on, the dichotomous pattern of the international 
involvement strengthened, with a US hands-off 
monopoly in political and security affairs39,  and 
the rest of the international community trying 
to compensate negative developments on the 
ground with an increase of financial assistance 
and cooperation policies.
Most efforts were washed away with the coming 
to power of Netanyahu with a single motto: 
security. The Likud government refused to fulfil 
Israeli obligations under previous agreements, 
multiplied challenging gestures, rejected the 
pursuit of negotiations, and adopted a very 
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heavy-handed policy in the PT.40  The peace 
process was never to recover from that period as, 
ultimately, the international community failed to 
exert enough pressure to prevent the disruption of 
the peace process.41 Finally acknowledging the 
volatility of the situation after the deadly clashes 
triggered by Israel’s approval of the opening of a 
tunnel under the Temple Mount, Clinton convened 
an emergency summit. He obtained from Arafat 
that he orders Palestinian police to cooperate 
with Israeli authorities and to rein in Palestinian 
riots (i.e. to intensify its repressive practices), 
and from Netanyahu that he halts incursions into 
autonomous Palestinian areas. If a new agreement 
was reached on Hebron by January 1997, its 
terms heightened Palestinians’ fears and brought 
new criticism on Arafat as it left the heart of the 
city in the hands of the Israeli settlers and army.42 
Palestinian disquiet was reinforced shortly 
afterwards by Israeli government’s approval of 
a new settlement in Eastern Jerusalem. As new 
clashes erupted, the PA was increasingly pressed 
by the US to further cooperate with the Israelis in 
security matters. Thus, with the US progressively 
embracing Netanyahu’s security demands, the PA 
was cornered into acting as a police auxiliary to 
Israeli forces. Pressed to sign a new US-sponsored 
Wye Plantation agreement also perceived as 
conceding too much,43 the PA upgraded its 
repressive practices, stifling the media, abusively 
arresting scores of Hamas and Jihad activists 
and adopting various measures violating civil 
liberties in the PT. Arafat’s position was further 
compromised by Netanyahu’s interpretation 
of the latest agreement and the measures taken 
accordingly.
If the US adopted throughout Netanyahu’s 
mandate a policy oscillating between frequent 
laisser-faire and occasional voluntarism, the rest 
of the international community voiced increasing 
concern regarding the likely consequences of 
Israeli policies. Unable and unwilling to play 
a distinct political role, the EU significantly 
upgraded its financial support and assistance to 
the PA, hoping to prevent the predicted socio-
economic explosion from happening. But the 
large amounts of money could not however 
prevent economic and social conditions from 
worsening. Moreover, the parallel establishment 
of security cooperation with the Palestinians 
to help them improve their record in law 
enforcement and anti-terrorist fight came at a 
price: the overlooking of human rights abuses in 
the name of security that required cracking down 
on activists and stifling dissidents. Significantly, 
and though deeply dissatisfied with Netanyahu’s 
policies, the EU never crossed the threshold of 
withholding further cooperation with Israel, let 
alone adopting sanctions. Therefore, though 
aware that terrorist acts had “political, economic 
and social causes”44,  that the acceleration of 
settlement programmes, the dilatory policies and 
the heavy-handedness of Israeli forces were all 
seriously threatening the peace process, the EU 
and the rest of the international community did not 
move as to forcefully press Netanyahu towards 
more compromising stances and challenge US 
monopoly over the political track. The farthest 
Europeans would go was to publicly deplore the 
Israeli counter-productive decisions and to lend 
symbolical support to a would-be Palestinian 
state while heavily weighing on Arafat in order to 
make him postpone any move towards statehood 
by the end of the interim period.
The election of Ehud Barak raised international 
hopes regarding a serious resumption of peace 
talks. Talks resumed, but as required by the new 
Prime Minister, the US did not involve in the 
substance of negotiations, somehow leaving the 
imbalance of power sort out the outcome, so 
Arafat had to accept unpopular terms. Coupled to 
the absence of any improvement of Palestinians’ 
daily conditions and a loss of faith in Israel’s 
willingness to make the necessary compromises 
in final status negotiations, this configuration 
refuelled Palestinian unrest. A first burst 
occurred by mid-May 2000 on prisoners’ issues: 
disregarding the build-up of frustration since 
Netanyahu’s mandate, Barak laid the blame on 
Arafat. The same scenario occurred a few months 
later. Convened by Clinton according to Barak’s 
preferences and in spite of Arafat’s objections, 
the Camp David failure was also laid on Arafat 
who had rejected a most generous offer as framed 
Global Images
HUMAN SECURITY JOURNAL                Volume 8, Spring 2009
▪ 80 ▪
by both the Israelis and Americans.45  Feared 
for several years by those most involved on the 
ground –particularly the Europeans– because of 
the degradation of Palestinians’ situation and their 
increased frustration at the substance and the pace 
of the peace process,46  the long-expected flashover 
was ignited by the controversial visit of Sharon 
on the Temple Mount. Palestinian demonstrations 
were violently repressed and fatalities toll 
rose rapidly. The Second Intifada had begun, 
signalling the failure of the peace process as it 
has been allowed to evolve by the international 
community, i.e. with a decreasing focus on core 
political issues that mattered most to Palestinians, 
a disregard for the policies undermining economic 
and social development in the PT and Palestinian 
faith in Israel’s commitment to the land for peace 
formula, and an artificial disconnection between 
simmering violence and large-scale human 
insecurities caused by Israel and increasingly by 
a repressive Palestinian Authority.47
the reframing of the Peace Process according 
to israel's security needs 
 The first days of the Intifada witnessed massive 
use of military power by Israeli forces. As 
Israel persisted in an escalation strategy while 
Palestinian activists, mostly beyond Arafat’s 
control, launched a wave of suicide-attacks48, 
last-minute efforts by Clinton failed to broker a 
breakthrough. With the concomitant taking over 
of Republican Bush in the US and Likud’s hawk 
Sharon in Israel, hopes dwindled. As insecurity for 
both Israelis and Palestinians rose to new levels, 
Sharon pursued a policy leading to the effective 
dismantlement of the PA infrastructure and the 
isolation and disqualification of its leadership. 
Particularly harsh on international criticism when 
voiced, Sharon’s government managed to impose 
a total halting of Palestinian violence as a pre-
condition in the plans successively devised to find 
a way out of the crisis. This has further blocked 
the situation for Palestinian violence roots were 
embedded in decades of subjugation and years of 
worsening conditions under the peace process and 
could not be stopped by a fingers’ snap. All the 
fragile truces Arafat called for were short-lived in 
a context where Israel did not deem self-restraint 
necessary. 
The Palestinians were dealt a severe blow with 
the 9/11 attacks on the US that allowed Sharon 
to draw parallels further ostracizing Palestinian 
violence as nothing but terror. The US were quick 
to adopt the reframing and soon embraced Israel’s 
stance according to which Arafat could no more 
be dealt with as a peace partner. The EU, which 
had cautiously stepped in to assuage the vacuum 
generated by the US and managed to promote 
the Quartet formula, progressively endorsed a 
tougher stance hence departing from previous 
analysis regarding Palestinian violence and its 
politico-socio-economic roots.49 Cautious not 
to antagonize Israel or collide with the US, the 
Europeans tried to hold on whatever positive input 
they could bring. So when Sharon decided in the 
aftermath of the 2002 spring climactic episode to 
link any dialogue with the transformation of the 
PA’s political, security and financial institutions, 
the EU acquiesced. Accordingly, it redirected 
its efforts towards pressing Arafat to implement 
demanded reforms and supplying financial 
assistance and technical monitoring.
Conducted in a surrealist context for the Palestinian 
institutions had been almost smashed by Israeli 
forces, these efforts aimed at transforming 
the PA into an exemplary democracy before a 
Palestinian state could even be born yielded some 
results, but none satisfactory enough to allow 
for renewed talks. Keeping in mind the need for 
a political move, the EU elaborated a Roadmap 
to put the peace process back on the track. The 
US withheld the text until the end of its war in 
Iraq, and when the Plan was officially launched 
by mid-2003, Bush had already mitigated its 
substance through unilateral acceptance of Israeli 
reservations. In parallel, another development 
that could undermine peace prospects was also 
underway: the construction of a security fence 
mostly on Palestinian lands. Though it hinted 
to a major new Israeli fait-accompli in terms of 
annexation and to further dispossession for tens 
of thousands of Palestinians, the project did not 
elicit much Western objection. As argued by EU 
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and US officials, Israel had every right to protect 
its citizens. Accordingly, they attempted to deny 
the International Court of Justice the capacity to 
give an advisory judgement when commissioned 
to by the UN General Assembly. And when the 
Court ruled that the fence was illegal in every 
respect and reminded that the PT were occupied 
territories, that Israel was violating fundamental 
humanitarian law provisions and that the 
international community had an obligation to act, 
most Western powers helped burry the issue.50
Actually, it was not international but Israeli 
dissatisfaction with Sharon’s policies that triggered 
a political move: the disengagement from Gaza. 
Framing the project as an implementation of Israeli 
obligations under the Roadmap in a unilateral 
fashion because Palestinians were lagging behind 
in the fulfilment of their commitments, Sharon 
managed to garner the Quartet’s support even 
though initial conditions (voiced particularly by 
the EU) were not met. The death of Arafat and the 
election of Abbas, the man Israelis and Americans 
preferred, did not alter Sharon’s planning and 
the international community did not insist on 
the resumption of political talks that would have 
allowed the disengagement to take place in the 
framework of a renewed peace process. Instead, 
priority was given to the technical arrangements 
needed for the administration of Gaza by the PA 
in the absence of any peace dynamic. Ultimately, 
in spite of the heavy involvement of third parties, 
the disengagement ended up with the quasi 
imprisonment of the Gazan population and, as 
hinted by Sharon’s top aide Weisglass, the dipping 
of the peace process in formaldehyde.51  If the 
move reconciled Israel with the international 
community, it objectively worsened the life of 
the Palestinians, weakened Abbas and gave room 
for military factions to step up the use of Qassam 
rockets on Southern Israel, which automatically 
reactivated the cycle of violence.
So once again, focused on Israel’s preferences, 
the international community deceived itself 
into believing that the circumstances of the 
disengagement would allow for a lowering of 
violence and the economic development of 
Gaza. Put differently, it lost sight of the need to 
foster a holistic approach taking into account the 
improvement of Palestinians’ political as well 
as economic prospects on the one hand, and the 
human security of the Palestinian population as 
much as the security of Israel and its citizens on 
the other hand. The legislative victory of Hamas 
over the discredited Fatah could have reminded 
the international community about such needs. 
Under the leadership of the US, the Quartet opted 
however for a policy ever more remote from a 
holistic and consistent approach. Disavowing the 
results of the democratic exercise it had advocated 
and monitored, the Quartet severed ties with the 
new government and suspended governmental 
aid and cooperation, in line with Israel’s policy 
and in opposition to the pleads of President 
Abbas. In so doing, the international community, 
and particularly the US and the EU, became 
directly involved in the aggravation of Palestinian 
insecurities.52 The embargo exacerbated internal 
tensions and triggered deadly clashes between 
Fatah and Hamas militants that culminated with 
the taking over of Gaza by Hamas in June 2007. 
Abbas nominated another government in the West 
Bank that was recognized by the international 
community. Such steps have fragmented further 
the Palestinian political fabric and discredited 
international discourses about democracy and 
the rule of law. In addition, coupled to Israel’s 
isolation strategy, they have led the Palestinian 
population into a permanent humanitarian crisis. 
In sharp contrast, Israel international insertion 
improved, particularly in the framework of UN 
institutions such as the UNESCO, and European 
institutions such as the OECE and the EU.
Hence, within a few years, the international 
approach has dramatically shifted and become 
increasingly dichotomous. Premised on the 
acknowledgement of Israel’s occupation of 
the PT and on the right of Palestinians to self-
determination, the land for peace formula 
practically lost ground. The connection between 
occupation and violence was dismissed and 
Israel’s right to protect its citizens from Palestinian 
terrorism gained absolute primacy. Consequently, 
the political peace process was made conditional 
to the fulfilment by the Palestinians of initially 
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Israeli demands later embraced by the US and 
the Quartet. That is, without a single favourable 
circumstance, to build a pacifist, democratic and 
rule of law abiding political system with a vibrant 
civil society and a prosperous liberal market 
economy. And, implicitly, to accept unilateral 
decisions made by the US and Israel about their 
leadership, the annexation of settlements, the fate 
of Jerusalem.53  If a sense of urgency was instilled 
by the taking over of Hamas in Gaza, it did not 
fundamentally alter the agenda of the international 
community. Reproducing previous inconclusive 
patterns, the Bush administration re-launched 
the peace talks in 2007 but was unable to foster 
any breakthrough. The rest of the international 
community resumed its endeavour (in the West 
Bank) on important yet sometimes premature 
issues considering the crippling situation on the 
ground (institutions, infrastructures, economy). 
Significantly, it did hardly improve the daily lives 
and the political prospects of the people.54  In 
parallel, Gaza continued to be marginalized and 
though a surge of international goodwill followed 
the dramatic worsening of humanitarian conditions 
after operation Cast Lead, significant relief did 
not materialize.55  In this context, it remains to be 
seen whether the new Obama administration will 
decisively put the peace process back on the track 
and help achieve significant results able to bring 
fresh hope to the populations.
Securing Human Security for all: tHe 
only Key to Peace
The overview that has just been sketched is not 
exhaustive. Yet, it sheds light on the developments 
that have derailed the peace process and illustrates 
how dichotomous and dis-synergetic international 
approaches have contributed to the present 
stalemate.
Many lessons could be drawn from this failure-
story in an era in which people can no more be 
expected to obediently trust their leaders with 
their fate and be totally muted. First, political 
agreements whose terms are premised on a huge 
power imbalance between the parties are bound 
to undermine the confidence of the weaker 
side’s public opinion in all of its own leaders, 
the adversary and the international community. 
Second, the implementation of political 
agreements in situations such as the one prevailing 
in the PT can not be successful if, in addition 
to the first problem, it does not provide for an 
immediate improvement in terms of freedom from 
fear (lessening of physical and political violence 
and betterment of human rights conditions) and 
freedom from want (enhancement of daily living 
conditions). Third, and conversely, the attempts to 
improve social and economic conditions and build 
welfare, economic and political institutions are 
likely to fail in the absence of a sound environment 
based on an agreed solution to basic contentious 
political issues. Fourth, hard security approaches 
are likely to fuel violence. The one adopted since 
Netanyahu’s era has proven for instance unable to 
address Palestinian violence. Quite the contrary; 
in retrospect, it is demonstrable that this policy has 
nurtured Palestinian unrest and has contributed to 
the closure of a rare window of opportunity for 
peace in the 1990s. Some would argue that Israel 
has finally achieved a higher level of security for 
its citizens with the construction of the security 
barrier that encompasses the main blocks of 
settlements. However, the physical separation is 
by no means a portent of pacification for it causes 
increased suffering, deprivation, estrangement 
and exclusion to the Palestinians and such 
phenomena bear the seeds of future violence. In 
short, there can be no reasonable prospects of 
long-term security for the Israelis as frustration 
and social disruptions are allowed to grow in the 
PT.
As a very powerful state both militarily and 
diplomatically, Israel has managed to contain –
but certainly not uproot– Palestinian violence 
and to reframe the terms of peace-making in 
ways that have shifted the bulk of responsibility 
on Palestinian shoulders and induced significant 
changes on the international agenda better suiting 
its own. Even if short-sighted as it disregards 
the long-term costs of a non-peace situation, the 
course of action chosen by the Israeli leadership 
can be understood as a self-interested exploitation 
of a favourable balance of power in the pursuit 
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of what seems by now to be a national goal: the 
annexation of significant portions of Palestinian 
territories notwithstanding the land for peace 
formula.56  Much less understandable is the position 
of the most prominent international actors who 
persistently advocate peace but have acquiesced 
to evolutions that have proven detrimental to a 
workable settlement. The paramount factor that 
has allowed for such a discrepancy is the strongly 
held view that Israel’s security –as Israel defines 
it– is a non-negotiable objective.57
This stance has arguably brought a relative 
improvement of Israeli security but it has also been 
critical in the overall degradation of Palestinian 
situation; it therefore nurtures current and future 
violence. This has been convincingly demonstrated 
by the former Personal representative of the 
UN Secretary-General to the PLO and the PA.58 
Building on his experience, Alvaro de Soto 
analyzes the unending missteps of both Israel 
and the Quartet that have, among other damages 
to peace prospects: aggravated the Palestinian 
situation on all accounts hence feeding despair 
and violence; cultivated a widespread belief in 
the Palestinian and Arab public opinions that the 
international community –including the UN– 
has sided with Israel and collectively punished 
the Palestinians for their 2006 electoral choice; 
locked Israel and the Quartet in a negative stance 
leaving no room for a credible resumption of the 
peace process. As an end result, the conventional 
conceptions of security that have been crucial in 
the acquiescence of the international community 
to the shifts in Israeli-Palestinian affairs have by 
no means allowed for enhanced security prospects 
for any of the parties involved.
Such an assessment brings us to the alternative 
notions of human security that are premised on the 
idea that international security, order and peace 
cannot rest solely on the security of sovereign 
states but depend, “as well, on individuals and 
their own sense of security”59. This idea obviously 
suggests the need to provide security and a sense 
of security for the Israelis. However, it also 
suggests an equal need to provide the same for the 
Palestinians. Considering the present situation, 
such a goal implies a major reorientation of 
international policies, i.e. a massive political and 
financial involvement in favour of the Palestinian 
side that is currently undergoing the “full 
spectrum of pain”60,  and a parallel diplomatic 
strategy to soothe Israel’s stances and soften its 
conceptions of sovereignty and security, which 
are both conceived of in absolute terms regardless 
the harm inflicted to the Palestinians.
One of the first elements human security notions 
draw attention to is the need to reconsider state 
security and sovereignty issues. With respect to 
Palestinian-Israeli affairs, this would entail the 
rethinking of current Israeli policies. A good place 
to start is to check Israeli governments’ record in 
providing their citizens with the level of security 
they claim to be striving for through their handling 
of the Palestinian problem. Unquestionably, the 
leadership has secured fair levels of freedom from 
fear and freedom from want: most people enjoy 
indeed the rights ensured by a political system 
abiding by the rule of law, a good access to the 
many securities provided by a welfare state and 
high economic standards. There are however some 
loopholes: beside increased economic inequalities, 
Israeli human rights groups have reported a swell 
in “infringements of human rights [stemming] 
from the policies and actions of government 
authorities, which either fail to protect rights or 
violate them directly. The ‘blanket’ of rights that 
the State is supposed to ensure for all individuals 
is steadily shrinking, leaving more room for rights 
violations and exposing more people to human 
rights infringements, often those who belong to 
the periphery”.61 Usually targeting Arab Israelis, 
such infringements have reportedly reached some 
Jewish Israeli peace groups lately.62 Regarding 
hard security, many of the policies adopted by 
the consecutive governments have had a negative 
impact in terms of actual harm to many citizens. 
Basically, the leadership has not delivered peace 
in spite of several windows of opportunity with 
its neighbours. Besides, many instances surveyed 
in section 2 suggest that the use of force by Israel 
has triggered surges of violence that have claimed 
Israeli lives. Consequently, even though Israel is 
the biggest power in the region and would virtually 
crush any existential military threat to the country,, 
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the policies of the various governments have not 
lessened random physical threat to the lives of 
their citizens because of uncompromising stances 
alimenting violence. Therefore, and though it is 
not much acknowledged, the policies of the state 
of Israel endanger to a significant extent the lives 
of its citizens by failing to deliver peace. 
The Israeli record regarding the Palestinian 
population is exponentially more dreadful. First, 
Israel has been occupying, settling, and in some 
cases annexing, Palestinian territories for forty 
years in violation of international law. In so doing, 
it has denied the Palestinians many of their basic 
political rights, including their recognition as a 
distinct people entitled to enjoy the right to self-
determination (at least until 1993). With these 
overall violations of Palestinian political rights 
comes a host of abuses threatening the physical 
security of the people: as resistance to occupation 
has been constantly delegitimized and diabolized 
as terror, Israeli authorities have routinely used 
hard means to subdue it. Such means include: 
arbitrary arrests and administrative detentions, 
physical mistreatment, torture, killings 
(unintentional, targeted, collateral). Israeli policies 
have also hindered Palestinian basic economic 
and political security: land seizures, expulsions, 
drastic restrictions on freedom of movement, 
closures, the destruction of infrastructures, the 
withholding of PA money and the subsequent 
disabling of the Authority to deliver basic services 
to its population. Such generalized abuses (whose 
forms and intensity may vary over time) highlight 
the predatory nature of Israel’s policies vis-à-
vis the Palestinian population and have led this 
latter into its present state of cumulative political, 
economic, social and humanitarian insecurities. 
If a fair and lasting peace is to be achieved, human 
security thinking suggests that the international 
community must step in to balance the scales 
between the two sides. First, there is an obvious 
need to rein in the predatory policies of the Israeli 
state and to obtain that it fulfils its obligations 
under international humanitarian law, i.e. to end 
the occupation of Palestinian territories and to 
respect the various human, political and economic 
rights of the Palestinians. The fulfilment of 
Israel’s obligations would necessarily take place 
in the framework of negotiations. Again, if such 
negotiations are to be successful, they should 
go beyond the imposition by the stronger side 
of its will on the weaker. As shown by the Oslo 
failures, most agreements signed by the PLO 
were perceived by significant portions of the 
population as detrimental to the Palestinian cause 
and have contributed to the delegitimization of the 
PA and, by way of consequence, to its repressive 
orientation.63  What is needed is a deal that would 
not only provide for the creation of a viable 
state fulfilling Palestinian political aspirations, 
but also legitimize and empower the Palestinian 
leadership. In short, any such deal should not 
be perceived by the bulk of the people as a 
renunciation to core rights. Of course, the same 
applies to the Israeli public opinion but much 
effort needs to be yielded to remind the Israelis 
of the basic provisions of international law and to 
soothe some overemphasized security concerns. 
Practically, this programme would require the 
international community: to monitor the substance 
of the negotiations to avoid a power-based and 
hence short-lived outcome; to ensure that trade-
offs do not trample the relevant international 
law provisions; and to help the parties devise 
sustainable and mutually satisfactory solutions.
On the level of implementation, the involvement 
of the international community would also be 
critical in various ways and at different levels. 
First comes the issue of violence: even though 
all acts of violence cannot be expected to cease 
overnight once a deal is reached, it is important 
that the logic of retaliation whether by Palestinian 
activists or Israeli forces and settlers be prevented 
from prevailing. Each side is likely to sustain 
painful losses but this is probably the price for 
preventing future greater losses. Perhaps the 
deployment of international observers –long 
advocated by the Palestinians and rejected by 
the Israelis– would help ease the violent tête-
à-tête between the parties. Second, though the 
international role would be crucial in Palestinian 
institution-building, such an effort should not be 
obsessively focused on security issues as has been 
the case since the late 1990s. Indeed, in contrast 
to official discourses insisting on democracy, the 
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rule of law, the improvement of the judiciary 
and civil liberties, the issue that has constantly 
dominated the agenda is “security”. Consequently, 
criticism has been particularly shy when the PA 
has cracked down on Palestinian activists and 
dissenting voices dissatisfied with the evolution 
of the peace process during the 1990s. It is now 
inaudible on Fatah/PA abuses in the West Bank 
targeting Hamas activists and supporters. Put 
differently, the international community should 
be careful not to push the Palestinian leadership 
towards repressive practices that would end up 
perpetuating the kind of insecurities Israel has 
long bred.64
Beyond issues pertaining to freedom from fear, 
a huge effort must be wielded in order to lift 
the Palestinian population out of its present 
humanitarian crisis and to provide it with the basic 
services while enabling the Palestinian authorities 
to take on their welfare role. Obviously, such an 
effort must extend as to put the Palestinian economy 
back on the track and enable the Palestinians to 
overcome their cumulative exclusions and start 
moving towards sustainable development. It is of 
utmost importance not only that the Palestinian 
economy starts to recover and prosper, but also 
that the development gap between Palestinian and 
Israeli societies starts to be narrowed. Considering 
the huge inequalities generated worldwide by the 
neo-liberal recipes for development advocated by 
Western actors and Western-led agencies since 
the 1990s, it is important that the international 
community heeds the need to foster alternative 
economic approaches that will ensure a balanced 
development of all sectors of the Palestinian 
society and prevent the persistence of pervasive 
poverty among the most vulnerable.65
concluSion
Achieving peace between the Israelis and the 
Palestinians is a very complex programme to 
pursue and implement. Because of the cumulative 
exclusions inflicted to the Palestinians in recent 
years, it is certainly a more difficult task today than 
it would have been ten years ago, and arguably 
it would be easier today than in further ten years 
of stalemate and simmering frustration. As has 
been shown through human security lenses, the 
overall insecurity in which the Palestinian society 
has been left to drown into in the name of Israel’s 
unquestioned right to security and self-defence 
has already generated extreme violence and will 
certainly produce further outbursts, claiming more 
Palestinian and Israeli lives. Just as the deepening 
inequalities on the global level are increasingly 
threatening international security and order, the 
on-going domination by a developed and mighty 
society of a weaker, underdeveloped and largely 
defenceless one will feed continued grievance, 
exclusion, social pathologies and political 
violence. Ultimately, Israel will not reach an 
optimal level of security for itself as a state or for 
its citizens unless it achieves with its neighbours 
a sustainable peace resting on fair and equitable 
terms acknowledging that both the Israelis and 
Palestinians are entitled to enjoy freedom from 
fear and freedom from want. The overview that 
has just been sketched is not exhaustive. Yet, it 
sheds light on the developments that have derailed 
the peace process and illustrates how dichotomous 
and dis-synergetic international approaches have 
contributed to the present stalemate.
So far, as a dominant actor, Israel has not displayed 
any awareness in this respect and its political 
leadership seems convinced that it will always be 
able to provide its citizens with security through 
forceful and military means while forwarding its 
interests. The past decades have proven that such 
a stance comprises a considerable measure of 
collective self-delusion and is ultimately a short-
sighted calculation. However, lessons from the 
recent past have been misconstrued as Israel still 
lays all the blame on Palestinian violence which 
has been sketched as an ex-nihilo phenomenon 
unrelated to the occupation and its abusive 
practices.  It is very unlikely that Israeli leaders 
will move by themselves as to recognize that the 
Palestinian people is also entitled to security and 
that freedom from fear and want for Palestinian 
individuals might be the best recipe for optimal 
and enduring security for the Israelis. The 
international community has the responsibility to 
push Israeli leaders in that direction. Taking on 
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this responsibility will require the international 
community, and particularly its Western actors, to 
engage Israel in order to restrain the illegal and 
predatory policies conducted in the name of an 
absolute sovereignty and an unlimited right to 
security. Most importantly, it will also require the 
international community to overcome the one-
sidedness it has displayed in recent years to lay a 
more social and less ideologically-driven gaze on 
the situation, to make accordingly a more relevant 
analysis of the violence wielded by each side and 
finally drive them towards workable solutions 
premised on the common entitlement of both 
populations to enjoy human security.
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